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Abstract
I develop and estimate a model of the labor market in which precautionary
savings interacts with labour market frictions to produce substantial inequality in
wealth among ex ante identical workers. I show that a model of on-the-job search,
in which workers are risk averse and markets are incomplete, provides a direct
and intuitive link between the empirical earnings and wealth distributions. The
mechanism that generates the high degree of wealth inequality in the model is
the dynamic of the “wage ladder” resulting from the search process. There is an
important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases generated by on-the-
job search (climbing the ladder) and the drop in income associated with job loss
(falling oﬀ the ladder). The behavior of workers in low paying jobs is primarily
governed by the expectation of wage growth, while the behavior of workers near the
top of the distribution is driven by the possibility of job loss.
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In this paper I provide a framework that accounts for both employment transitions and
savings behavior at the micro-level and the distributions of wealth and earnings at the
aggregate level. I do so by developing and estimating a labor search model with sav-
ings, where the distributions of earnings and wealth are the result of a labor market
characterized by informational frictions and the possibility of job destruction.
Labor markets feature a surprisingly large degree of wage dispersion across workers,
even within narrowly deﬁned markets. This leads to earnings inequality that is large, and
exists even within groups of observationally similar individuals. Accompanying the large
dispersion in wages is an even larger dispersion in wealth. In industrialized countries,
wealth is much more unequal than earnings. The distribution of wealth is characterized
by a long right tail; a very large amount of wealth is held by a small fraction of individuals.
Many households, and in some countries the majority of households, never accumulate
much private wealth.1
Although wealth dispersion is not usually considered a labor market feature, it is the
cumulative result of decisions made by individuals who live in an environment character-
ized by substantial wage dispersion and high job turnover, both in terms of transitions
between employment and unemployment, and also in terms of transitions between jobs.
There are numerous theories for why earnings are so unequal relying on ex ante produc-
tivity diﬀerences across workers.2 Mortensen (1990) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
provide an alternative model of earnings dispersion, primarily aimed at addressing the
question “Why are similar workers paid diﬀerently?” This framework focuses on diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrm productivity and recruiting or wage policies combined with informational
frictions that make it costly for workers to become fully informed about the wage policies
of all ﬁrms. This framework, generally referred to as the Burdett-Mortensen model, is
1The empirical regularities of income inequality have been documented by Gottschalk and Smeeding
(1997) for OECD countries and by Boudría Rodriguez, Díaz-Giménez, Quadrini, and Ríos-Rull (2002)
for the United States. Davies and Shorrocks (2000) outline the stylized facts for wealth inequality.
2See Neal and Rosen (2000) for an overview.attractive because it provides a uniﬁed theory of job turnover and earnings inequality,
and implies a dispersed wage oﬀer distribution, even when workers are ex ante identi-
cal.3 Search models of the labor market provide a rigorous yet tractable framework for
addressing questions of the dynamics associated with labor market experiences, including
individual workers’ wage dynamics and wage dispersion.4 In this paper I demonstrate that
search models are also well suited to analyzing workers’ precautionary savings behavior
and the resulting wealth inequality.
The mechanism that generates the high degree of wealth inequality in the model
is the dynamic of the “wage ladder” resulting from the search process. There is an
important asymmetry between the incremental wage increases generated by on-the-job
search (climbing the ladder) and the drop in income associated with job loss (falling oﬀ
the ladder). This feature of the model generates diﬀerential savings behavior at diﬀerent
points in the earnings distribution. The behavior of workers in low paying jobs is primarily
governed by the expectation of wage growth, while the behavior of workers near the top
of the distribution is driven by the possibility of job loss. The wage growth expected
by low wage workers, combined with the fact that their earnings are not much higher
than unemployment beneﬁts, causes them to dis-save. As a worker’s wage increases,
the incentive to save increases: the potential for wage growth declines and it becomes
increasingly important to insure against the large income reduction associated with job
loss. The fact that high wage and low wage workers have such diﬀerent savings behavior
leads to a wealth distribution that is much more unequal than the wage distribution.
This paper contributes to the recent literature that attempts to account for wealth
inequality, such as Krusell and Smith (1998) and Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-
Rull (2003). Both of these papers study wealth inequality within a framework of ex
ante identical individuals who behave optimally in the face of uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks to income. They ﬁnd that it is diﬃcult to jointly reconcile the individual income
3Mortensen (2003) provides a complete development of the Burdett-Mortensen model, including many
of the extensions that make the framework well suited to empirical analysis of labor markets.
4Ar e c e n ts u r v e yo fs e a r c ht h e o r yi sp r o v i d e db yR o g e r s o n ,S h i m e r ,a n dW r i g h t( 2 0 0 5 ) .As u r v e yo f
the empirical search literature is provided by Eckstein and van den Berg (2007).
2dynamics with aggregate income and wealth inequality. Krusell and Smith (1998) ﬁnd
that the ﬁt to wealth inequality can be improved dramatically if heterogeneity in the
rate of time preference is used. Small diﬀerences in the rate of time preference across
individuals results in large diﬀerences in savings behavior over time. Castañeda, Díaz-
Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003) adopt an alternative approach. Instead of using an income
process estimated from the data, they target the Lorenz coordinates for income and wealth
inequality, and let the income dynamics be whatever is necessary to generate the observed
inequality. As a result, the model can replicate the cross sectional income and wealth
distributions found in the data, but the dynamics of the model’s income process do not
have a direct empirical counterpart. Qualitatively, the model I develop can be viewed
as a micro-foundation for the exogenous stochastic discount factor of Krusell and Smith
(1998) and the particular exogenous income process of Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and
Ríos-Rull (2003). I estimate the dynamics of the income process within a labor search
model, and aggregate up earnings and wealth to check whether the inequality in earnings
and wealth from the model replicates that observed in the data. This exercise requires
the model to ﬁt both the dynamics of individual labor market histories and the cross-
sectional implications for the distribution of earnings and assets. The model preforms
well on many dimensions, although there is a tension when ﬁtting employment dynamics
and wage dynamics simultaneously.
This paper also contributes to the literature on search models that include a savings
decision.5 This literature has been primarily concerned with the eﬀect of an individual’s
wealth level on his search eﬀort or reservation wage decision. I fully develop a theory
for optimal savings in this environment, and show that the parameters characterizing the
5Direct empirical support for a positive eﬀect of wealth levels on unemployment durations is provided
by Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007). The theoretical literature includes the original contribution on
risk aversion and reservations wages by Danforth (1979), and the recent contributions of Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999), Costain (1999), Lentz and Tranæs (2005), Rendón (2006), Browning, Crossley, and Smith
(2007), and Lentz (2009). One of the innovations of the current paper is the incorporation of on-the-job
search, which I show to be an important mechanism for delivering a very dispersed wealth distribution.
Recent work incorporating savings into a Mortensen-Pissarides type model with aggregate ﬂuctuations
includes Bils, Chang, and Kim (Forthcoming), Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin (2010), and Bayer and
Wälde (2010a,b).
3frictions in the labor market have a direct and intuitive interpretation in the workers’
optimal savings decision, which implies that wealth will be much more unequal than
earnings.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes the optimal search and savings decisions of workers. I discuss estimation
challenges and a strategy for identiﬁcation of the model parameters using simulation-
based estimation in Section 3. Estimation results and the quantitative implications of
the model are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and provides directions for
further research. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.6
2 A Model of On-The-Job Search and Savings
Time is continuous and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Within a well-deﬁned labor
market workers are homogeneous in terms of productivity. Workers are ex ante identical,
but will diﬀer ex post due to diﬀering labor market histories. Workers are risk averse
and derive utility from consumption and disutility from the eﬀort of searching for a new
job. Markets are incomplete in the sense that workers cannot trade a complete set of
contingent claims for consumption. Workers are restricted to self-insure against income
loss by accumulating assets.
Let the workers’ planning horizon be inﬁnite and let streams of consumption and





−ρt[u(ct) − e(st)]dt, (1)
where ρ is the subjective rate of time preference, ct is the instantaneous consumption ﬂow
at time t,a n dst is the search eﬀort at time t. Period utility has the Constant Relative
6Extended derivations, some numerical details, and robustness exercises are collected in the companion
Web Appendix.


















where η>1 is the elasticity of search costs with respect to eﬀort, and µ>0 is a scaling
parameter. Workers are impatient in that the subjective rate of time preference exceeds
the risk free rate, ρ>r .
At any time t the worker may be unemployed or employed. Workers search for jobs and
make consumption decisions both when unemployed and when employed. The probability
of ﬁnding a job is described by a Poisson arrival process, where the arrival rate depends
positively on the intensity of the worker’s search eﬀort: λs.U p o nc o n t a c t i n gaj o b ,t h e
workers face a known stationary oﬀer distribution F(w), w ∈ [w,w], where the oﬀer
is a constant wage for the duration of the job. Jobs end when either a worker ﬁnds a
higher paying job or is exogenously separated at exponential rate δ. W(a,w) denotes the
expected present value of being employed with assets a and a wage w,a n dU(a) denotes
the expected present value of being unemployed with asset level a.
The budget constraint can be described by the asset accumulation equation and the
stochastic process governing labor income. A worker accumulates assets according to
da =[ ra+ i − c]dt subject to a ≥ a, (2)
where r is the risk free interest rate, a is the current asset level, i is income from wages or
unemployment beneﬁts, c is consumption, and a is the lower bound on assets. A worker’s





dqλs1(W(a,x) ≥ U(a))[x − b], when unemployed,
dqλs1(W(a,x) ≥ W(a,w))[x − w]+[ b − w]dqδ, when employed,
(3)
where 1(·) is the indicator function that takes a value of one when the argument is true
and zero otherwise, x is drawn from the wage oﬀer distribution F(w), dqλs =1when a
job oﬀer arrives and 0 otherwise, and dqδ =1when a job is exogenously destroyed and 0
otherwise.7
Consider the problem of a worker who is currently unemployed with assets a.A t
each instant the worker faces the possibility, which is increasing in search eﬀort s,o f
a job oﬀer with Poisson probability λs. When an oﬀer arrives, he will accept it if the
value of working at the oﬀered wage W(a,w) exceeds the value of remaining unemployed
U(a). Since both the time until a job oﬀer arrives and the potential wage once an oﬀer
is received are uncertain, the problem facing the unemployed worker is to decide how
much to consume at each instant while unemployed, how hard to search for work, and
the minimum acceptable wage oﬀer, ˜ w(a), that will induce a move from unemployment
to employment. In general all of these decisions may depend on current assets a.
When employed, workers engage in on-the-job search, and face an exogenous proba-
bility δ of job destruction.
The problem outlined in equations (1), (2), and (3) can be conveniently represented
using the continuous time Bellman equations for the value of being unemployed with
assets a and the value of being employed with assets a and wage w:
ρU(a)= m a x
0≤c≤a−a,0≤s
￿






7A general model with additional stochastic non-labor income is outlined in Web Appendix B.1.
6ρW(a,w)= m a x
0≤c≤a−a,0≤s
￿
u(c) − e(s)+Wa(a,w)[ra+ w − c]
+ λs
ˆ
max{W(a,x) − W(a,w),0}dF(x)+δ[U(a) − W(a,w)]
￿
. (5)
The ﬂow value of being unemployed with assets a is given by the utility ﬂow from con-
sumption u(c) less the disutility of search eﬀort e(s) plus the expected change in the
value of unemployment. The latter has two parts. First, the value of unemployment
changes because assets change due to accumulation (or decumulation). This is the term
Ua(a)[ra + b − c]:t h e m a r g i n a l v a l u e o f a s s e t s t i m e s t h e i n s t a n t a n e o u s c h a n g e i n a s -
sets. Second, the value of being unemployed changes in expectation by the product
of the arrival rate of job oﬀers and the expected net gain associated with job oﬀers:
λs
´
max{W(a,x) − U(a),0}dF(x). When employed, the ﬂow value of employment will
additionally change in expectation by the product of the job destruction rate and the net
loss associated with losing wage w: δ[U(a) − W(a,w)].
The lower bound on assets a is taken to be the self-imposed borrowing limit a = −b/r,
where r is the risk free rate (Aiyagari, 1994). A worker will never choose to borrow an
amount in excess of what he can service and maintain positive consumption, even if
unemployed indeﬁnitely.8
I now turn to the discussion of optimal search eﬀort and optimal consumption choices
for workers. The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for optimal consumption and search












max{W(a,x) − W(a,w),0}dF(x). (9)
8Making use of the self imposed borrowing constraint simpliﬁes the derivation of optimal consumption
since the marginal utility of consumption can always be equated to the marginal value of wealth.
7Conditions (6) and (8) require the marginal utility ﬂow of consumption to be equal to the
marginal value of assets, both when unemployed and unemployed. This is the standard
inter-temporal result that expected utility cannot be increased by additional savings or
borrowing. Conditions (7) and (9) require the marginal cost of search eﬀort to be equal
to the expected change in value associated with an accepted wage oﬀer. Search eﬀort is
chosen such that expected utility cannot be increased by exerting more or less eﬀort.
In addition to making consumption and search eﬀort decisions, unemployed workers
must decide on the minimum wage oﬀer that will induce a move from unemployment to
employment. This reservation wage is the unique solution to W(a, ˜ w(a)) = U(a).
Proposition 1. The reservation wage for unemployed workers is independent of assets
and equal to the unemployment beneﬁt: ˜ w(a)=b.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The constant reservation wage is a direct consequence of the fact that the job contact
rate λ and the disutility of search e(s) do not depend on the worker’s employment status.
Since there is no option value associated with remaining unemployed, any wage higher
than the unemployment beneﬁt is acceptable. Although the reservation wage is constant
and independent of assets, the transition rate out of unemployment varies with assets







u￿(c)+[ u￿￿(c)cw][ra+ x − c]




where ϕ is the inverse function for the marginal cost of search e￿(s).
Finally, optimal consumption growth for the periods between job transitions can be























8the equation for asset accumulation
˙ a = ra+ w − c,
and the present-value budget constraint
lim
t→∞e
−rta(t) ≥ 0, (a.s.), (12)
where ˙ x = dx/dt, γ = −u￿￿(c)c/u￿(c) is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and I
make use of the shorthand F(w)=[ 1− F(w)], ˆ c = c(a,x),a n dc = c(a,w)=c(a,b).
Since all workers will reject wage oﬀers below the common reservation wage b,w ec a n
always normalize the wage oﬀer distribution to have w = b.9 Equations (10)–(12) must
hold at all times, meaning that at the instant a new wage oﬀer is accepted, or a job is
destroyed, search eﬀort and consumption must change discretely to ensure the worker is
on the saddle path implied by the new wage. In other words, equation (11) describes
consumption growth between jumps, when dqλs1(W (a,w￿) ≥ W (a,w)) = dqδ =0 .
The consumption growth equation (11) provides a direct and intuitive link between
the labor market frictions λ and δ and the motives for saving or dis-saving of workers
at various points in the earnings distribution. To highlight the direct eﬀect that the
“job ladder” has on savings behaviour, I ﬁrst consider the case in which search eﬀort is
exogenous, s =1 .
Proposition 2. In the case where search eﬀort is exogenous (s =1 )t h ej o bc o n t a c ta n d
job destruction rates have opposing inﬂuences on the incentive to save or dis-save, and
the tension from these opposing forces results in a target level of savings that depends on
the current wage.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
9Indeed, in an equilibrium version of the model, optimization by ﬁrms would ensure this is the case
since oﬀers below b would never be accepted.
9Examination of equation (11) reveals the eﬀect of the “wage ladder” on the savings
behavior of workers at diﬀerent points of the earnings distribution.
1. As in an environment with perfect certainty, r−ρ represents the importance of the
rate of time preference relative to the interest rate in determining savings.
2. λ represents the potential for wage growth and induces additional impatience over
and above the pure rate of time preference ρ. The inﬂuence of expected wage growth
is greatest at the lowest wage w and falls monotonically as the wage increases, having
no eﬀect at the highest wage w.A st h ec u r r e n tw a g ei n c r e a s e s ,t h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
receiving a higher wage oﬀer falls. Similarly, as the current wage increases, the
expectation of any change in the marginal utility of consumption (due to ex post
Euler equation errors) also falls.
3. δ represents the risk of job loss, and induces precautionary savings. The eﬀect on
savings of unemployment risk is greatest at the highest wage w and falls mono-
tonically, having no eﬀect at the lowest wage w.I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h ec o s to fh a v i n gn o
savings, in terms of the required change in the marginal utility of consumption, is
zero for a worker who looses a job which pays w = b,s i n c eh i sﬂ o wb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t
has not changed. If we consider a worker who initially has zero savings but is lucky
enough to receive the highest wage oﬀer w,t h ec o s to fn o ts a v i n gi nt h ee v e n to f
aj o bl o s si sac h a n g ei nt h em a r g i n a lu t i l i t yo fc o n s u m p t i o nf r o mu￿ (w) to u￿ (b).
Faced with this possibility, a worker lucky enough to obtain the highest wage oﬀer
will save at a very high rate in an attempt to smooth out any such change.
4. Given any wage w there is a target asset level a∗(w) that balances the competing
inﬂuences in 1) 2) and 3). Once a∗(w) is attained, the worker will maintain a
constant consumption level, equal to wage plus interest income, until he either
switches jobs or becomes unemployed.10
10Carroll (2004) proves the existence of a target level of savings in a discrete time framework, a result
that had previously been a robust feature of simulations but not proved generally.
10The key to generating heterogeneity in savings is that expected gains and losses in income
are not symmetric, and diﬀer according to the current wage. Workers in the lowest paying
jobs expect to gain much more when oﬀered a new job than they expect to lose if that
job is lost; this results in a desire to bring future income forward. Conversely, workers at
the highest paying jobs have very little expectation of wage growth, but will lose a lot in
the event of job loss, resulting in a strong motive to build up precautionary savings as a
means to insure consumption across this transition.
I now return to the case of endogenous search eﬀort. The advantage of modeling search
eﬀort is that it allows for the possibility that both unemployment and job durations are
increasing in current assets, with job durations also increasing in the current wage, a
feature that turns out to be empirically relevant. While it is straightforward to establish
Proposition 2 for the case of exogenous search, I have not established that this will hold
generally with endogenous search.
Proposition 3. When search eﬀort is endogenous, consumption is monotonically in-
creasing in assets (ca (a,w) > 0)a n ds e a r c he ﬀ o r ti sm o n o t o n i c a l l yd e c r e a s i n gi nt h e
wage (sw (a,w)). Additionally, either consumption is increasing in the wage and search
eﬀort is decreasing in assets (cw (a,w) > 0,s a (a,w) < 0), or consumption is decreasing
in the wage and search eﬀort is increasing in assets (cw (a,w) < 0,s a (a,w) > 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In order for Proposition 2 to continue to hold with endogenous search eﬀort, it must be
the case that the marginal value of assets is decreasing in the wage, implying that at least
part of any wage increase is consumed (wage increases do not decrease consumption).
In a two state model with no on-the-job search Lentz and Tranæs (2005) prove that
when utility is separable in consumption and search eﬀort, the marginal value of assets
is higher when unemployed than when employed, which implies that consumption is
higher when employed than when unemployed and that search eﬀort decreases with assets.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that in the current model with on-the-job search
11consumption is higher at the maximum possible wage than at any other wage. What I
have not established are assumptions on the primitives that guarantee that for any wage
w￿ >wwe have c(a,w￿) >c(a,w). However, this implication is very natural and does
hold at the parameter estimates in this paper (and in all simulations I have conducted).
Remark 1. When search eﬀort is endogenous, if
u￿(c(a,w￿))
u￿(c(a,w)) < 1 for all w￿ >w ,t h e ns e a r c h
eﬀort is monotonically decreasing in both wages and assets.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In the next proposition, the target asset level of a worker employed at the highest wage
is examined. This level determines the upper bound on assets (and does not depend on
whether search eﬀort is endogenous or exogenous).
Proposition 4. Under the assumption that workers are suﬃciently impatient (ρ>r ),
the upper bound on desired assets is ﬁnite, and deﬁned implicitly by the equation
w + ra = φ
￿
δu￿(c(a,w))
ρ + δ − r
￿
, (13)
where φ is the inverse function of the marginal utility of consumption. In the limit as
(ρ − r)/δ tends to zero, this tends to
w + ra = c(a,w). (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The upper bound on assets is determined endogenously by the desire to smooth the
marginal utility of consumption across employment states. When (ρ − r)/δ is small,
workers at the highest wage save up to the point at which they can minimize any discrete
change in consumption at the instant of a job loss.11
11See Web Appendix B.5 for a characterization using phase diagrams.
123I d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o n a n d E s t i m a t i o n
To solve the model requires knowledge of the wage oﬀer distribution F (w),t h er i s k
free rate r,t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eρ,t h ec o e ﬃ c i e n to fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nγ,t h e
elasticity of search costs with respect to eﬀort η,t h es c a l eo ft h ed i s u t i l i t yo fs e a r c hµ,
the arrival rate of job oﬀers λ,a n dt h ej o bd e s t r u c t i o nr a t eδ.Iﬁ xt h er i s kf r e er a t ea t
three percent, the rate of time preference at ﬁve percent, and the scale of the disutility of
search eﬀort at one. This leaves F (w), γ, η, λ,a n dδ to estimate. It is possible to directly
identify F (w) using wages accepted out of unemployment. This approach makes use of
the fact that, as outlined in Proposition 1, workers only reject wage oﬀers if they fall
below their current wage. I normalize the wage oﬀer distribution to have lower support
w = b so that there are no oﬀers below the common reservation wage of the unemployed
b; unemployed workers never reject wage oﬀers.12 The distribution of wages accepted out
of unemployment is a consistent estimate of the wage oﬀer distribution F (w),a n dc a n
be estimated non-parametrically (Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg, 1999, 2000). The
weekly employment-to-unemployment transition rate is a direct estimate of δdt.G i v e n
F (w), the elasticity of search cost with respect to eﬀort η is identiﬁed (up to the scale
factor λ)f r o mt h eu n e m p l o y m e n t - t o - e m p l o y m e n ta n dj o b - t o - j o bt r a n s i t i o np r o b a b i l i t i e s ,







Given δ, F (w),a n dη,t h ea g ep r o ﬁ l eo fe m p l o y m e n tr a t e si sd i r e c t l yi n f o r m a t i v ea b o u t
λ through the equation describing the evolution of employment for the cohort
Et =( 1− δ)Et−1 +( 1− Et−1)λ
ˆ
s(a,b)ht (a)da,
12In general, the job contact rate and the mass of oﬀers below the reservation rate are not separately
identiﬁed without adding further structure, for example, by modelling wage posting behaviour of ﬁrms.
13where ht (a) is the distribution of asset holdings among the unemployed when the cohort
is age t.
Finally, I turn to identifying the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ. Equation (11)
indicates that the most informative moments here would involve consumption growth. In
the absence of panel data on consumption, I use panel data on assets. Consumption and
asset growth are linked in a direct manner through the budget constraint. To pin down
γ, Iu s et h em o m e n t sd e s c r i b i n ga s s e ta c c u m u l a t i o n ,∆at, var(∆at), cov (∆at,∆at−1),
and the age proﬁle for mean assets at.
In addition to the moments described above, which are suﬃcient to identify all the
parameters of the model, I also use the moments describing wage growth ∆wt, var(∆wt),
cov (∆wt,∆wt−1), which impose the over identifying restriction that the model is also
consistent with the reduced form for wage dynamics. The information on wage levels is
already captured in the non-parametric estimation of the wage oﬀer distribution.
3.1 Indirect Inference
The data for this analysis are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
(NLSY). I use the white male sample for the years 1985 to 2002. The restriction of
attention to white males is motivated by an attempt to create a relatively homogeneous
subgroup that is well described by the model developed in the paper. The NLSY data
provides weekly information on each individual’s current employment status, wage, and
whether the worker continued the next week at the same job, a new job, or transited to
unemployment. The asset data are provided at the interview date, which is at most once
a year. I use indirect inference (Smith, 1993; Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993) to
overcome the fact that assets are only partially observed, at irregularly spaced interview
dates. Indirect inference proceeds by estimating descriptive (as opposed to structural)
models on both the actual data and on data simulated from the structural model, and
estimating the structural parameters by minimizing the distance between the coeﬃcients
from these auxiliary regressions. I choose the auxiliary models to capture the dynamics
14of assets and wages, and labour market transitions conditional on these state variables.
Speciﬁcally, they correspond to the following twelve regressions (estimated separately by
education group):
Employment Dynamics
E2Ui,m = β1 + x
￿
i,mα1,x + α1,i + ε1,i,m (15)
J2Ji,m = α2 + β2,aai,m + β2,wwi,m + x
￿
i,mα2,x + α2,i + ε2,i,m (16)
U2Ei,m = α3 + β3,aai,m + x
￿



















































β10,tdt + ε10,i,t (24)








β12,tdt + ε12,i,t. (26)
15Table 1: Conditional Transition Probabilities
High school College
Data I II Data I II
E2U constant 0.0423 0.0417 0.0418 0.0190 0.0189 0.0171
(0.0009) [0.63] [0.56] (0.0007) [0.04] [2.41]
U2E assets -0.0810 -0.078 -0.0762 -0.0939 -0.0448 -0.0305
(0.0321) [0.10] [0.15] (0.0463) [1.06] [1.37]
J2J assets -0.0167 0.0046 0.0046 -0.0039 0.0115 0.0054
(0.0019) [11.17] [11.14] (0.0014) [10.67] [6.47]
wage -0.0149 -0.0255 -0.0256 -0.0134 -0.0537 -0.0197
(0.0017) [6.10] [3.14] (0.0017) [22.94] [3.55]
Note: The standard errors for the auxiliary model estimates from the data are in parenthesis. All
coeﬃcients and standard errors have been multiplied by 10. The t-statistic for a test that the each
coeﬃcient estimate from the data is equal to the estimate from the model is presented in square brackets.
The subscript m refers to a week and t refers to a year. E2Ui,m, J2Ji,m,a n dU2Ei,m
are binary indicators for employment-to-unemployment, job-to-job, and unemployment-
to-employment transitions between weeks m and m +1 . dt is a dummy variable for
the year t. Ei,t is equal to the number of weeks worked by individual i during year t.
Details describing the NLSY, the sample used for estimation, and variable construction
are presented in Appendix A.2.
The vector of β-coeﬃcients in (15) to (26) are matched in estimation. The α-
coeﬃcients are treated as nuisance parameters used to control for unmodeled hetero-
geneity; the vector xi,m includes controls for marital status, number of children, ru-
ral/urban and region of residence. Identical regressions are estimated on the NLSY data
and data simulated from the model, with the exception that for the model αk,x = αk,i =0 ,
k = {1,2,3}.13
Auxiliary models (15) to (17) capture job destruction plus the relationship between
assets and wages and the probability of exiting unemployment or of making a job-to-job
transition. The β-coeﬃcients from these regressions are presented in the columns labeled
Data in Table 1. There is a negative relationship between assets and the probability
13The model is one of homogeneous workers and is not designed in the current form to account for
diﬀerences in outcomes across workers due to ex-ante worker heterogeneity. The interpretation of the
results are conditional on the assumption of ex-ante homogeneous workers. I leave to future work the
explicit modelling of potential heterogeneity in preferences, costs, or productivity, and the potential
eﬀects on aggregates of such heterogeneity.
16of exiting unemployment or changing jobs, and there is a negative relationship between
wages and the probability of changing jobs. In the model this pattern can be replicated
via search eﬀort decreasing in both assets and wages.
The dynamics of wages and assets are captured by auxiliary models (18) to (24). In
addition to the labor market transitions and wage and asset dynamics, I use auxiliary
models (25) and (26) to capture the aggregate employment rates and asset accumulation
as the cohort ages. In Figures 1 and 2, panels (a) to (i), I plot the coeﬃcients that
correspond to the age proﬁles for the mean, variance and autocovariance of wage and asset
changes, for low and high education groups respectively, along with the the covariance
between wage and asset changes, the employment rate and the age proﬁle for assets. The
wage moments are suﬃcient to identify the variances in a reduced form model of income
dynamics with a permanent and transitory shock, where the variance of the permanent
shock is time varying (see Meghir and Pistaferri 2011 for details). Between the ages of 23
and 39, mean wage growth is relatively low and stable for low educated workers, while it
is slightly higher for young highly educated workers, and decreasing with age. For both
education groups the variance of wage growth decreases with age, and the autocovariance
is slightly negative and relatively stable. Turning to mean changes in assets, the age
proﬁle is positive and stable for the low education group, and positive and decreasing
for the high education group. The variance and autocovariance of asset changes are
quite noisy, and do not appear to have a strong age proﬁle. The covariance between
wage changes and asset changes is positive, but fairly noisy. For both education groups
employment rises very rapidly at early ages, and then remains fairly stable, and mean
assets increase with age.
Key to the estimation strategy is sampling from the model simulated data in a manner
consistent with how the actual data were sampled. I do this by simulating data for the
same number of individuals as I observe in the NLSY, and for the same number of
years as recorded in the NLSY. To ensure the initial conditions are matched, I start the
simulation using the initial employment status, wage (if employed) and asset levels of










































































































(l) cov (at,w t)
Figure 1: Data and Model Moments: Low Education
Note: The thin dashed line and the thin dotted lines are the data, plus and minus two standard errors.
The thick dashed lines are for model speciﬁcation I, and the thick solid lines are model speciﬁcation II.










































































































(l) cov (at,w t)
Figure 2: Data and Model Moments: High Education
Note: The thin dashed line and the thin dotted lines are the data, plus and minus two standard errors.
The thick dashed lines are for model speciﬁcation I, and the thick solid lines are model speciﬁcation II.
19the NLSY workers at the beginning of 1985. Additionally, from the simulation, I sample
assets at an annual frequency and wages at a weekly frequency. Further details regarding
estimation are presented in Appendix A.3.
4Q u a n t i t a t i v e R e s u l t s
I present estimates for two model speciﬁcations that diﬀer, essentially, by the number of
estimated parameters and the number of moments used to ﬁt the parameters. The ﬁrst
set of estimates ﬁx the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at two and assume search costs
are quadratic. This leaves only the job destruction rate δ,a n dt h ej o bc o n t a c tr a t eλ,
as free parameters. These are estimated by matching only the empirical employment-
to-unemployment transition rate and the age proﬁle of employment rates, Et (auxiliary
models (15) and (25)).
The model, not surprisingly, provides a near perfect ﬁt to these targeted moments
for both the low and high educated workers (see Table 1, the last row of column I and
Figures 1 and 2, panel (h)). The ability of this restricted model to ﬁt the other moments
will be discussed below in relation to the second set of estimates.
The second set of parameter estimates also estimate the elasticity of search costs with
respect to eﬀort η,a n dt h ec o e ﬃ c i e n to fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o nγ.I nt h i sc a s eIu s et h e1 2
auxiliary regressions (15) to (26). The estimated coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst three auxiliary
models are presented in Table 1. The estimated coeﬃcients from the last nine auxiliary
models are presented in Figures 1 and 2, panels (a) to (i). There is little diﬀerence in
terms of the estimate of δ between the two approaches, which is not surprising since this
parameter is so tightly linked to the empirical employment-unemployment transition rate.
In terms of search costs, the estimated version turns out to be substantially lower than
quadratic; 1.17 and 1.27 for the low and high education groups respectively. The lower
elasticity of search costs is oﬀset by a smaller estimate of the job contact rate, implying
more scope for endogenous search eﬀort than what one obtains by assuming quadratic
20Table 2: Parameter Estimates
High school College
II I II I
r:r i s kf r e er a t e 0 . 0 3
ρ:t i m ep r e f e r e n c e 0 . 0 5
µ:s e a r c hc o s t ss c a l e 1 . 0
δ:j o bd e s t r u c t i o n 0 . 2 2 1 0 . 2 1 6 0 . 0 9 8 9 0 . 0 8 9 3
rate [0.219, 0.224] [0.215, 0.219] [0.097, 0.101] [0.089, 0.090]
λ:j o bc o n t a c tr a t e 0 . 6 1 5 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 4 0 7 0 . 1 4 4
[0.588, 0.643] [0.184, 0.194] [0.387, 0.434] [0.141, 0.147]
η:e l a s t i c i t yo fs e a r c h 2 . 0 1 . 1 6 8 2 . 0 1 . 2 6 8
costs w.r.t. eﬀort - [1.166, 1.176] - [1.258, 1.274]
γ:r e l a t i v er i s k 2 . 0 1 . 4 5 5 2 . 0 1 . 2 4 9
aversion - [1.441, 1.487] - [1.204, 1.284]
Note: 95 percent conﬁdence intervals in square brackets (2.5 and 97.5 quantiles of the quasi-posterior
distribution). Speciﬁcation I targets the age proﬁle of employment and the job destruction rate (auxiliary
models (15) and (25)). Speciﬁcation II uses all the auxiliary models (15) to (26).
search costs. Surprisingly, estimating the search costs does very little to change the ﬁt to
the conditional transition probabilities other than improving the ﬁt of the eﬀect of the
wage on the job-to-job transition rate, as indicated in Table 1. Similarly, the estimates for
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion are well below two for both low and high educated
workers at 1.46 and 1.25 respectively. The higher estimated risk aversion for low relative
to high educated workers is driven by the lower asset growth of the former (recall the
pure rate of time preference is assumed to be common for both groups).
Turning to the model ﬁt between the two speciﬁcations, we can see clearly where
the model does well, and also where the tensions lie. As already mentioned, when only
targeting the employment transitions, the model matches the age proﬁle of employment
almost exactly (Panel (h) in Figures 1 and 2). This ﬁt, however, comes at the cost of a
poor representation of wage dynamics. Looking at panels (a) and (b) of these same ﬁgures
we see that the model overstates both the mean and variance of wage growth. Conversely,
when these moments are included in estimation, the model is able to describe well the
wage dynamics, but at the cost of understating the employment rates (by approximately
ten and ﬁve percentage points for the low and high educated worker, respectively). The
21tension here arises from the fact that the model puts a lot of structure on how wages can
change. Indeed, the model requires wages to rise only when workers change jobs, and to
fall only when workers experience a spell of unemployment. In order to match the low
rate of wage growth in the data, the model requires a low job-to-job transition rate. Since
the technology for changing jobs is assumed to be the same as the technology for ﬁnding
jobs, this also results in workers leaving unemployment at a lower rate, resulting directly
in a lower employment rate. The model is well suited to jointly reproducing employment
dynamics and the cross-sectional distribution of wages, but is somewhat less successful
at also reproducing wage dynamics.14
With the exception of the age proﬁle of employment and mean asset holdings, the
moments used in estimation are all in diﬀerences (individual labour market transitions
and wage and asset changes). In panels (j), (k) and (l) I plot the implications for three
macro moments that are not used in estimation: the age proﬁles of the variance of assets,
the variance of wages and the covariance of assets and wages. Qualitatively, the model
reproduces the rising variance of assets with age and the rising covariance between assets
and wages, although to a slightly higher level than what we see in the data. The age
proﬁle of the variance of wages from the model is at odds with the increasing empirical
proﬁle. The model implies that the variance of wages falls during the ﬁrst ﬁve years
before increasing, while the data is more consistent with a monotonic increase with age.
At this point it is useful to remind ourselves that the model is very parsimoniously
parametrized. There are no time-varying parameters or shocks. The earnings process is
completely characterized by a stationary wage oﬀer distribution, a constant job destruc-
tion rate and a constant job contact rate. The age proﬁles of the moments generated by
the model are purely the result of the cohort moving from an initial distribution toward
the stationary distribution implied by the steady state of the model. The ﬁt of the model
14Recent work by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) ﬁnds that an on-the-job search model extended to
feature ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shocks and wages renegotiated when it is mutually agreeable to do so
can jointly match the employment and wage dynamics. That said, theirs is is a model with risk neutral
workers, and it is a non-trivial task to incorporate these types of wage contracts when workers are risk
averse and can save.
22to the data suggests that the logic of the job search model, where workers actively search
for better opportunities and save to protect their standard of living in the event of job
can provide a very useful interpretation of the data.
4.1 Aggregate Implications for the Distribution of Earnings, Wealth
and Consumption
Up to this point I have evaluated the model along the same dimensions used in estima-
tion, looking at the implications for employment transitions and the age proﬁles of wage
growth and asset accumulations within the cohort. The model does a reasonably good
job at reproducing the age proﬁles for the mean and variance of assets. I turn next to
the question of whether data simulated from the model, and suitably aggregated, pro-
vides a reasonable description of the cross-sectional distributions of wages, wealth, and
consumption for the entire US population.
In order to approximate a cross-section from the economy I pool over education and
age as follows. The model is simulated separately for low and high education groups for
ages 25 to 65, starting with the initial conditions for employment, wages, and assets in the
NLSY. The simulated data is then pooled over age and education, where the number of
simulations within each education group is proportional to its size in the NLSY data. The
pooled data can be viewed as approximating an overlapping generations economy with a
constant age structure, where each new generation starts life with the same distribution of
initial assets. The implications of the model in terms of the aggregate earnings, wealth,
and consumption distributions are presented in Table 3. Here I present the share of
earnings, wealth and consumption held by quintile, plus the top decile broken into the
90-95th, 95th-99th and 99th-100th percentiles. I also present these shares calculated
separately within education group to highlight the eﬀect of aggregating over skill. The
corresponding shares for the US economy are also presented, and are taken directly from
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003, Tables 7 and 8).
23Table 3: Distributions of Earnings, Wealth and Consumption: Data and Model
Quintile Top Groups
90th– 95th– 99th–
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 95th 99th 100th
(a) Distribution of Earnings
Data -0.40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76
Model Pooled 1.01 10.62 16.50 23.21 48.66 10.77 13.39 8.38
Low Ed 1.03 11.61 18.11 24.89 44.35 11.20 11.76 4.30
High Ed 1.17 10.83 16.07 21.31 50.62 11.21 15.40 8.88
(b) Distribution of Wealth
Data -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55
Model Pooled -6.72 -1.32 4.91 16.66 86.48 16.95 27.81 22.83
Low Ed -13.77 -5.03 4.85 22.30 91.66 21.71 29.67 14.83
High Ed -3.45 0.66 5.55 15.49 81.74 16.51 28.42 19.38
(c) Distribution of Consumption
Data I 6.87 12.27 17.27 23.33 40.27 9.71 10.30 4.83
Data II 7.19 12.96 17.80 23.77 38.28 9.43 9.69 3.77
Model Pooled 11.51 15.03 17.53 20.84 35.09 7.99 9.14 5.10
Low Ed 13.60 17.10 19.46 22.01 27.83 6.95 6.33 2.08
High Ed 10.24 14.22 16.98 20.93 37.64 8.60 10.18 5.46
Note: The cells represent the share of earnings/wealth/consumption held by the corresponding quantile;
ie, the shares held by the ﬁve quintiles add to 100. The rows labeled data are taken directly from
Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003, Tables 7 and 8), and are based on the US SCF and
the CEX. Consumption deﬁnition I is expenditure on non durables. Deﬁnition II also includes imputed
service ﬂows of consumer durables.
24The main discrepancy between the model simulation and the US cross sectional data is
that the model is missing the very highest earnings and those who have negative earnings.
This is a direct implication of the sample I selected when estimating the wage oﬀer
distribution, which excludes the self employed. We see in Table 3, panel (a) that in the
data the bottom quintile has a negative share of total earnings -0.4 percent, representing
losses taken by entrepreneurs. Since the model does not admit negative wages (assuming
a positive ﬂow value when unemployed b)i tc l e a r l yc a n n o tg e n e r a t ean e g a t i v es h a r eo f
earnings for the bottom quintile. The share implied by the model is, however, very low
at just over one percent. Looking at the fourth quintile, the model matches the data very
well with both actual and simulated data giving a share of 23 percent. Turning to the
other three quintiles, we see that the model implies substantially less earnings dispersion
than what is in the data. In the data the top quintile receives 61 percent of earnings
while the model implies 49 percent, with the extra share distributed over the ﬁrst second
and third quintiles. Looking within the top quintile, we see that the discrepancy is all
coming from the top decile, which receives 43.5 percent of earnings in the data and 32.5
percent in the model.
The cross-sectional distribution of wealth in the US is even more unequal than earn-
ings, as can be seen in Table 3, panel (b). The share of wealth of the bottom quintile is
negative (-0.39 percent) while the top quintile holds 79 percent of wealth, with 30 percent
of total wealth held by the top one percent. The model actually implies a distribution of
wealth that is even more unequal than that in the data. In the model the bottom two
quintiles both hold a negative share; workers borrow much more in the model than in
the data implying the bottom quintile holds -6.7 percent of wealth as opposed to -0.39
percent observed in the data. The top quintile in the model holds an even larger share
of wealth than in the data at 86 percent relative to 79 percent. Even though the model
over predicts the share of wealth of the top quintile, it under predicts the share held by
the top one percent by almost seven percentage points.
Looking next at the cross-sectional distribution of consumption presented in panel (c),
25the model aligns quite well with the data. Using a deﬁnition of consumption that includes
non durables plus an imputed consumption ﬂow from durables, the model matches the
third quintile exactly at 24 percent, while implying slightly lower shares than the data for
the top two quintiles (lower by approximately three percentage points each) and implying
slightly higher shares for the bottom two quintiles (higher by four and two percentage
points). Since the model implies a distribution of consumption that is quite similar to
the data, while at the same time implying a more equal earnings distribution and less
equal wealth distribution (looking at the quintile shares), agents in the model are using
borrowing and savings as a way to smooth consumption to a greater extent than ap-
pears to be the case in the data. It should also be noted that the model is constructed
to represent ex ante identical workers (within education groups) and, given the inﬁnite
planning horizon, abstracts from any life cycle motive for saving (such as saving for a
down payment, children’s education, or retirement). In contrast, the raw cross-sectional
distributions contain a substantial amount of individual heterogeneity, which will natu-
rally lead to more dispersion than the homogeneous model can produce. Clearly adding
more heterogeneity to the model, either by pooling over more skill groups, explicitly ac-
counting for permanent diﬀerences between workers, or modelling entrepreneurs, would
increase the model dispersion, aligning it closer to the data.
4.2 Further Implications and Related Literature
The ability of the model to produce substantial inequality in wealth is largely attributable
to the eﬀect on savings behavior of the wage ladder induced by on-the-job search. This
mechanism, which arises endogenously in the model, can readily be related to the work of
Krusell and Smith (1998) and Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003). There are
several interesting cross-sectional implications that arise from the workers’ consumption
growth equation (11). Rewrite the consumption growth (equivalently, the asset accumu-
lation) equation in terms of the interest rate and an individual speciﬁc “eﬀective discount
26rate” ρi, where i indexes individuals and
















Now the right hand side of equation (11) becomes γ−1(r − ρi), where individuals are all
“discounting” at a diﬀerent rate, and as a result, have very diﬀerent savings behavior.
Written in this form there is a close relationship to the stochastic discount rates used by
Krusell and Smith (1998, KS), where individuals are heterogeneous in their rate of time
preference, which evolves stochastically and leads to a very unequal wealth distribution.
Here, the individual discount rates ρi jump at (random) employment transitions. There
is, however, an important distinction between the two setups. In the KS setup, individuals
are poor or rich (in terms of wealth) because they either have a high or low rate of time
preference; they prefer to be poor or rich. In contrast, in the current setup, all workers
have identical preferences, and they would behave identically in the same circumstances;
the diﬀerences across individuals arise from diﬀerent sequences of good and bad luck in
the labor market.
Krusell and Smith (1998) ﬁnd they can get a very good ﬁt to the wealth distribution
with three quarterly discount factors, 0.9930, 0.9894, and 0.9858, which correspond to
annual discount rates of 2.85, 4.35, and 5.89 percent. Individuals spend an average of
50 years with the same discount rate. Using the same pooled simulation discussed in
Section 4.1, I present in Table 4 the ﬁrst quartile, the median, and the third quartile of
annual eﬀective discount rates from the current model, which are 0.3, 2.5 and 6.2 percent.
The dispersion between the ﬁrst and third quartile is quite a bit larger than between the
highest and lowest discount rates used by KS. The expected duration spent within the
same quartile is between two and six years, which is substantially less than the 50-year
durations in KS. The dispersion in wealth in KS results from small but very persistent
diﬀerences in discounting across individuals, where in the present paper the diﬀerences in
eﬀective discount rates can be very large, but are not very persistent. While qualitatively
27Table 4: Eﬀective Discount Rates
(a) Pooled Education
Quantile ρi βi To
From q1 q2 q3 q4
0.25 0.003 0.997 q1 99.46 0.21 0.03 0.31
0.50 0.025 0.975 q2 0.02 99.65 0.06 0.28
0.75 0.062 0.940 q3 0.03 0.02 99.65 0.30
q4 0.52 0.14 0.26 99.09
(b) Low Education
Quantile ρi βi To
From q1 q2 q3 q4
0.25 -0.002 1.002 q1 99.34 0.24 0.05 0.37
0.50 0.026 0.974 q2 0.02 99.53 0.08 0.37
0.75 0.066 0.936 q3 0.03 0.04 99.54 0.40
q4 0.63 0.21 0.32 98.84
(c) High Education
Quantile ρi βi To
From q1 q2 q3 q4
0.25 0.009 0.991 q1 99.64 0.19 0.01 0.16
0.50 0.025 0.975 q2 0.01 99.75 0.07 0.17
0.75 0.052 0.949 q3 0.04 0.01 99.78 0.17
q4 0.33 0.07 0.13 99.46
Note: The transition matrix is calculated at a weekly rate. q1 refers to workers with an eﬀective discount
rate in the lowest quartile and q4 refers to workers with an eﬀective discount rate in the highest quartile.
The transition matrix for the pooled group is created by pooling the low and high eduction simulations,
in proportion to their representation in the NLSY, and refers to weekly transitions.
28the current model shares the ﬂavor of stochastic discounting with KS, it does not seem
to play same role quantitatively.
The wage ladder process for earnings, endogenously resulting from on-the-job search,
implies that expected wage growth is declining in the current wage, and the income
loss associated with job destruction is increasing in the current wage. The exogenous
earnings process (more precisely, productivity process) that Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez,
and Ríos-Rull (2003, CDR) ﬁnd is needed to account for the dispersion in wealth shares
these qualitative features; the probability of obtaining a higher wage is decreasing in the
current wage, and the income loss associated with exiting the highest wage is substantial.
To get a feeling for how similar the wage ladder process is to the CDR process I replicate
the corresponding transition matrix based on the current model. In Table 5, panel (a)
Ir e p r o d u c et h et r a n s i t i o nm a t r i x ,r e l a t i v ew a g e sa n dp o p u l a t i o ns h a r e sf r o mT a b l e s4
and 5 of CDR. Using data simulated from the current model, I bin wages into the same
four population shares, comprising 61.1, 22.4, 16.5, and 0.04 percent of the population.
The CDR process implies that the wages of the four groups, relative to the ﬁrst group
are 1.0, 3.2, 9.8 and 1061.0; the most productive 0.04 percent of workers earn wages over
1000 times those of the least productive 61 percent. The same calculation in the current
model, presented in Table 5, panel (b), implies the average wages within each group,
relative to the ﬁrst, are 1.0, 2.8, 5.9, and 41.2. The wages among the top 0.04 percent
are substantially higher than the bottom, however they would still need to be 25 times
greater to match the CDR calibration. In addition to the large diﬀerence in relative wage
of the top group, there are also diﬀerences in the patterns of persistence in the groups. In
the CDR calibration the probability of exiting the top group is signiﬁcantly greater than
the probability of exiting the other three groups. This is not the case with the current
model, where the probability of exiting the top group is only slightly greater than at the
bottom, and is actually less than the probability of exiting the two middle groups. The
idea of falling oﬀ the wage ladder is clear in this table: conditional on exiting the top
group, a worker will end up in the bottom group with probability one.
29Table 5: Relative Wages and Transition Probabilities






4 Relative w Share
w1 96.24 1.14 0.39 0.006 1.00 61.11
w2 3.07 94.33 0.37 0.000 3.15 22.35
w3 1.50 0.43 95.82 0.020 9.78 16.50
w4 10.66 0.49 6.11 80.51 1061.00 0.0389






4 Relative w Share
w1 91.03 5.08 3.89 0.008 1.00 61.11
w2 12.66 86.81 0.53 0.000 2.77 22.35
w3 12.33 0.38 87.29 0.002 5.92 16.50
w4 10.14 0.00 0.00 89.86 41.22 0.0389






4 Relative w Share
w1 65.38 13.81 10.28 10.52 1.00 25.0
w2 11.42 82.59 2.93 3.05 24.53 25.0
w3 11.11 1.32 86.47 1.10 38.85 25.0
w4 11.52 0.73 0.51 87.24 84.72 25.0
maxw 785.70 -
Note: panel (a) is taken directly form Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (2003, Tables 4 and
5). The model data is computed by pooling a simulation of low and high skilled workers (weighted
according to representation in the NLSY), and pooling over ages 25 to 65. This simulated economy can
be interpreted as an overlapping generations economy with a constant age structure. The transition
matrices in panels (b) and (c) are created by ﬁrst ﬁnding the wage quantiles that correspond to the
shares in the last column, and then ﬁnding the fraction of yearly transitions between these quantiles in
the simulated data. The relative wage is calculated as the mean wage in the speciﬁed quantile relative to
the mean wage in the ﬁrst quantile. The last row, labeled maxw,c o n t a i n st h em a x i m u mw a g er e l a t i v e
to the average wage in the ﬁrst quartile.
30In Table 5, panel (c) I present the same statistics, but with equally sized groups.
Comparing again relative wages, the amount of dispersion becomes clearer; the average
wage in the top quartile is 84.7 times that of the bottom quartile, and the very top wage
is 785.7 times the average in the bottom quartile. The model also implies substantial
movement between the quartiles. Persistence decreases as we move up the quartiles since
the probability of receiving a higher wage oﬀer is declining in wages; search eﬀort is
declining as the workers have both higher wages and more assets; and the probability
of job loss remains constant. In both the CDR model and the current model the top
end of the wealth distribution is driven by the behavior of those who are lucky enough
to receive the highest wage. The relative diﬀerence between the top and bottom wage
in these models is very large, and it is the desire to smooth the marginal utility of
consumption in the expectation of losing this wage that drives this small group in the
population to accumulate such a high degree of savings.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I show that a model of the labor market with on-the-job search and saving
can generate substantial dispersion in both earnings and wealth. In a labor market
characterized by informational frictions and the possibility of job destruction, workers
with diﬀerent wages will exhibit very diﬀerent savings behavior. The speciﬁc earnings
process generated by the search model implies that only a very few lucky individuals
will reach the highest wage, and once there, a job loss means falling all the way back to
the bottom. Faced with such a large expected income loss, these workers save at a very
high rate and accumulate substantial assets. Qualitatively, the equation characterizing
consumption growth provides a direct and intuitive link between the labor market frictions
and the motives for saving or dis-saving at various points in the earnings and asset
distribution.
Quantitatively, the model performs well on many dimensions, including wage dynam-
31ics and the cross-sectional distributions of earnings, wealth, and consumption. There is
somewhat of a tension when ﬁtting employment dynamics and wage dynamics simulta-
neously, as the parsimony of the model places strong restrictions on the joint evolution
of wages and employment. Understanding these joint dynamics within an equilibrium
search model is on the research agenda, and substantial progress has already been made
in Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2009). The model misses somewhat the extremes of the
earnings distribution, suggesting that the ﬁt could be substantially improved by the in-
corporation of entrepreneurs in the model. In principle it is possible to use the ﬁrm
side from an equilibrium version of the model to attribute earnings to this group. That
said, one would need data on ﬁrm proﬁts in order to put some discipline on this aspect
of the model. Given the increasing availability of matched employee-employer data this
should prove a fruitful line of inquiry, as already demonstrated in papers such as Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) and Lentz and Mortensen (2010).
32AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Since for all asset levels a, the value of being employed W(a,w) is in-
creasing in w, an employed worker always accepts any wage higher than his current wage. Since
at each asset level a, the value of being unemployed U(a) is independent of w, then for any asset
level a there is a unique reservation wage ˜ w(a) above which the value of employment is higher
than the value of unemployment. This reservation wage is the unique solution to
W(a, ˜ w(a)) = U(a).
Expanding this relationship gives








[W(a,x) − W(a, ˜ w(a))]dF(x)+δ[U(a) − W(a, ˜ w(a))]
= ρW(a, ˜ w(a))
Substituting W(a, ˜ w(a)) = U(a) using the reservation wage property, and substituting u￿(c)=
Ua = Wa using the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption we have
u(c(a,b)) − e(s(a,b)) − u(c(a, ˜ w(a))) + e(s(a, ˜ w(a)))
+ u￿(c(a,b))[ra+ b − c(a,b)] − u￿(c(a, ˜ w(a)))[ra+˜ w(a) − c(a, ˜ w(a))]
+[ λs(a,b) − λs(a, ˜ w(a))]
ˆ w
˜ w(a)
[W(a,x) − W(a, ˜ w(a))]dF(x)=0 .
We can directly verify that the solution occurs at
s(a, ˜ w(a)) = s(a,b),c (a, ˜ w(a)) = c(a,b), and ˜ w(a)=b.
The reservation wage is independent of assets and equal to the unemployment beneﬁts.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this we need to show that for all w￿ >wwe have u￿ (c(a,w￿)) <
u￿ (c(a,w)). In other words, we need to show that consumption is increasing in the wage. To
establish this it is convenient to work in discrete time and then let the time interval shrink
to zero. Throughout I will assume that the time interval ∆ is suﬃciently short such that ￿
1 − λF (w)∆− δ∆
￿
> 0.15
The time zero value of worker’s problem can be written as











subject to at+1 =( 1+r∆)at +( wt − ct)∆,a ≥ a.
15See Web Appendix B.4 for a derivation of equation (5) as the limit of the discrete time Bellman
equation.







be the optimal solution to the workers’ utility maximization problem (27) for















t +( 1− λ)c2
t . Then the control variable cλ
t satisfy the budget equation
aλ
t+1 =( 1+r∆)aλ
t + wt − cλ
t ,
















λa1 +( 1− λ)a2,w
￿
.
Since u(c) is strictly concave,
u(λc1











































This proves concavity of W (a,w) with respect to assets.
Lemma 2. Consumption is increasing in assets, ∂c/∂a > 0.





The concavity of W (a,w) with respect to assets and of u(c) imply that ∂c/∂a > 0.
Lemma 3. Consumption is increasing is the wage, ∂c/∂w > 0.












+ δ∆W(a￿,w)+[ 1− λF (w)∆− δ∆]W(a￿,w)+o(∆t)
￿￿
,



























Deﬁne T as the operator on the RHS of (28). This operator satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient
conditions for a contraction: monotonicity and discounting (ρ>rimplies (1 + r∆)/(1 + ρ∆) <
1). Assume that Wa (a,w) is non-increasing in w. We will verify that T maps the space of non-

















































































Waa (a￿,w) < 0 by strict concavity in a. Waw (a￿,w) < 0 by assumption. In the case where
next period’s assets are non-decreasing in the wage, ∂a￿
∂w ≥ 0, the marginal value of assets is
unambiguously decreasing in the wage, Waw (a,w) < 0, implying that consumption is increasing
in the wage. Consider the alternative case where next period’s assets are decreasing in the wage.
Direct inspection of the asset accumulation equation reveals ∂a
∂w =1− ∂c
∂w, which implies that
∂c
∂w > 1. This proves consumption is increasing in the wage.
Now, by Lemma 3, for all w￿ >wwe have u￿ (c(a,w￿)) <u ￿ (c(a,w)).I ne q u a t i o n( 1 1 ) ,t h e
term multiplying λ is therefore positive and decreasing in the wage, while the term multiplying


























For any wage level w, there is a target level of assets, a∗(w), at which point the savings rate is









































w [u￿(c(a,x)) − u￿(c(a,w))]dF(x)
e￿￿ (s)
. (32)
Looking at equations (29) to (32) it is clear that consumption is increasing in assets (the value
function is still concave in assets since utility is additively separable in consumption and search
eﬀort, and search eﬀort does not change the linearity of the budget constraint). Search eﬀort
is decreasing in wages (the value function is increasing in the wage). Additionally, either con-
sumption is increasing in the wage and search eﬀort is decreasing in assets, or consumption is
decreasing in the wage and search eﬀort is increasing in assets. The former will be true whenever
the marginal value of assets is decreasing in the wage.



























Deﬁne T as the operator on the RHS of (33). Assume that Wa (a,w) is non-increasing in w.




















































Under the assumption that Wa (a,w) is non-increasing in w, all the terms on the RHS of (34)
are negative, except for the last term which is positive. When search eﬀort is endogenous it
is not possible to unambiguously sign the RHS, leaving open the possibility that the marginal
value of assets is not everywhere decreasing in the wage, and thus we are not able to verify the
conjecture. In order for the marginal value of assets to be everywhere decreasing in the wage it
must be the case that, at the solution, the eﬀect of the last term is not too large.
36Proof of Proposition 4. Setting equation (11) equal to zero gives





































ρ + λsF(w)+δ − r
￿
, (35)
where φ is the inverse function of the marginal utility of consumption u￿(c). Setting ˙ a ≡ da/dt =
0 (the asset accumulation equation) gives
c = w + ra. (36)
For the existence of a stable saddle-path equilibrium, it is necessary that ρ>r− δ − λsF(w),
which collapses to ρ>r− δ since it must hold at all w ∈ [w,w]. The existence of a ﬁnite
upper bound on assets requires more, speciﬁcally that ρ>r .This can be seen by equating
equations (35) and (36), and evaluating at w = w:
w + ra = φ
￿
δu￿(c(a,w))
ρ + δ − r
￿
. (37)
Equation (37) can be rewritten as
(ρ − r)u￿ (c(a,w)) = δ
￿
u￿(c(a,w)) − u￿ (c(a,w))
￿
,
where c(a,w) >c(a,w) implies the right hand side is strictly positive for any ﬁnite a,i m p l y i n g
ρ − r is strictly positive for ﬁnite c.
In the limit, as (ρ − r)/δ tends to zero from above, equation (37) tends to
w + ra = c(a,w).
A.2 Data
The data for this analysis are from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY).
The NLSY consists of 12,686 individuals who were 14 to 21 years of age as of January, 1979. The
NLSY contains a nationally representative random sample, as well as an over-sample of black,
Hispanic, the military, and poor white individuals. A complete labor market history, by week,
can be constructed for each individual in the sample. The labor market history provides the
potential of over 1,300 weekly observations per individual, including the current weekly earnings,
transitions to and from unemployment and between jobs. Since 1985, the NLSY contains detailed
questions on the asset holdings of each individual. The asset data are not observed at the same
frequency as the labor market data; asset data are collected at interview dates, providing at most
one observation on assets per year. I discuss the estimation issues arising from this partially
observed state variable in Section 3.
37A.2.1 Construction of Sample Used in Estimation
I use the white male sample from the NLSY data for the years 1985 to 2002. The restriction
of attention to white males is motivated by an attempt to create a relatively homogeneous
subgroup that is well described by the model developed in the paper. Since the schooling
decision is exogenous to the model, I only include data for individuals once they have completed
their education. I also drop individuals who have served in the military, or have identiﬁed their
labor force status as out of the labor force. The majority of individuals who are not in the labor
force report being disabled and are clearly not searching for employment. I subdivide the data
into two education groups: those with a high school degree, and those with a college degree. I
do not use data on high school dropouts and college dropouts. The summary statistics for these
groups are too diﬀerent from either included group to pool them, and the sample sizes are too
small to use on their own. Since not all individuals ﬁnished school at the same time, and some
have dropped out of the survey, I am left with an unbalanced panel of 792 high school graduates
(567,895 person weeks), and 581 college graduates (340,264 person weeks). With working and
unemployed as the only two labor force states in the model, I need to choose a cutoﬀ for the
number of hours that qualify as employed. I follow Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann (2001) and
deﬁne employment as working 35 hours or more a week. The moments used in estimation are
not very sensitive to an alternative deﬁnition of 40 hours. See Tables 7 and 8.
Monetary variables are adjusted for inﬂation using the GDP deﬂator. To reduce the inﬂuence
of outlying observations, I trim the top and bottom one-half-of-one percent of the wage and asset
observations. I follow the deﬁnition of total assets used by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Imai
and Keane (2004). I construct total assets (net worth) by adding up the following variables in the
NLSY: “Total market value of vehicles including automobiles r/spouse own,” “Total market value
of farm/business/other property r/spouse own,” “Market value of residential property r/spouse
own,” “Total market value of stocks/bonds/mutual funds,” “Total amount of money assets like
savings accounts of r/spouse,” “Total market value of all other assets each worth more than
$500.” From this I subtract the total of “Total amount of money r/spouse owe on vehicles
including automobiles,” “Total amount of debts on farm/business/other property r/spouse owe,”
“Amount of mortgages and back taxes r/spouse owe on residential property,” “Total amount of
other debts over $500 r/spouse owe.” As a sensitivity exercise, I also present the moments based
on ﬁnancial assets only (see Tables 7 and 8).
The model developed in Section 2 assumes that the wage oﬀer distribution is stationary. Since
the NLSY data is based on a cohort, there are two sources of non-stationarity in observed wages.
The ﬁrst is that we observe this cohort as they are moving toward the stationary distribution,
since they begin life out of employment and are slowly moving up the wage ladder. This aspect
of the non-stationarity can be fully accounted for by thinking of the cohort as a sample of
unemployed workers who we follow forward. The second source of non-stationarity comes from
sectoral growth. Since the model does not have growth, I detrend the data using the following
procedure, designed to ensure a stationary wage oﬀer distribution. Let wo
it be the log of wages
accepted out of unemployment. I estimate the growth in the wage oﬀer distribution by the
regression wo
it = a+gt+uit. I then detrend all wages using ˆ g. Thus, the wage oﬀer distribution
has the same mean every year by construction, and any increases over time in the mean of
accepted wages are attributed to the eﬀect of on-the-job search. The estimates for sectoral
growth are 1.87 percent for low educated workers and 4.31 percent for high educated workers,
suggesting substantial skill bias over this period.
The model is written assuming workers are single individuals. To approximate this ﬁction in
the data I project assets oﬀ of controls for marital status and number of children, removing the
deterministic component associated with family size. In all the empirical work I deﬁne wages







. This is a log-type transformation that admits zero
or negative values (see Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) for a discussion of the desirability
of this transformation when working with wealth data). When matching moments, the same
transformations are done on both the NLSY data and the model generated data.
The lower bound on wealth used in the model is the self-imposed borrowing constraint:
−w/r. I estimate the lowest possible wage, w, using the lowest 0.5 percentile of the observed wage
distribution by education. This value is also used for the ﬂow income of unemployed workers.
The implied lower bounds on wealth are -85,068 and -169,025 for low and high educated workers
respectively. These values line up reasonably well with the corresponding lowest 0.5 percentile of
the observed asset distributions by education: -75,358 and -153,120 with respective 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals (-76,880, -73,398) and (-181,499, -134,999). It seems that the self imposed
borrow limit provides a reasonable approximation to the empirical lower bound on assets.
In the auxiliary regressions (15) to (17), I deﬁne the variables as follows: E2Ui,m equals
one if the worker is employed in week m and unemployed in week m +1 , and equal to zero if
employed in both weeks m and m +1 . J2Ji,m equals one if the worker is employed at job j in
m and employed at job k ￿= j in week m +1 , and equal to zero if the worker is employed at job
j in both weeks m and m+1. In addition, if the worker experiences a spell of unemployment of
two weeks or less between job changes this is coded as J2Jit =1 . This is done in an attempt to
avoid misclassifying short vacation breaks between jobs as unemployment spells. U2Ei,m equals
one if the worker is unemployed in week m and employed in week m +1 , and equals zero if the
worker is unemployed in both weeks m and m +1 .
A.3 Estimation
Conditional on the ﬁrst step non-parametric estimate of F (w), the structural parameters θ =
{γ,η,λ,δ} can be estimated by minimizing the distance between the regression coeﬃcients es-
timated on the actual data, and the average the same regression coeﬃcients estimated on R
simulated data sets:























and Ω(ˆ β) is the diagonal of the covariance matrix for the regression coeﬃcients estimated from
the NLSY data. In practice this extremum estimator is diﬃcult to work with since for any ﬁnite
R the objective function is not smooth due to simulation error and the discrete jumps that occur
as a result of search.
To address this issue I use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method for classical
estimators proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2003). Estimation proceeds by simulating a












and conﬁdence intervals are constructed from the empirical quantiles of the sequence of θj.T o
simulate a chain that converges to the quasi posterior, I use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The algorithm generates a chain
￿
θ0,θ1,...,θB￿
as follows. First, choose a starting value θ0.
Next, generate ξ from a proposal density q
￿
ξ|θj￿
and update θj+1 from θj for j =1 ,2,...using
θj+1 =
￿













This procedure is repeated many times to obtain a chain of length B that represents the ergodic
distribution of θ. Choosing the prior π (θ) to be uniform and the proposal density to be a random






The main advantage of this estimation strategy is that it only requires function evaluations,
and thus the discontinuous jumps do not cause the same problems that would occur with a
gradient based extremum estimator. Additionally, the converged chain provides a direct way to
construct valid conﬁdence intervals for the parameter estimates. The drawback of the procedure
is that it requires a very long chain, and consequently a very large number of function evaluations,
each requiring the model to be solved and simulated. In practice, I simulate 100 chains in
parallel, each of length 10,000, and use the last 2000 elements (pooled over the 100 chains) to
obtain parameter estimates and conﬁdence intervals. Details pertaining to tuning the MCMC
algorithm, a parallel implementation, and related methods in statistics can be found in Robert
and Casella (2004), Vrugt, ter Braak, Diks, Higdon, Robinson, and Hyman (2009), and Sisson
and Fan (2011).
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